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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 34 JANUARY 1981 NUMBER 1
Corporate Distributions and the
Income Tax: A Consideration of
the Inconsistency Between
Subchapter C and Its Underlying
Policy
Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A shareholder may realize the gain on his investment by sell-
ing his shares to a new investor, by "selling" his shares to the is-
suer, or by receiving a distribution of corporate assets as a divi-
dend. A sale of shares results in income to the seller, but only to
the extent that the amount realized exceeds the seller's adjusted
basis. In contrast, a pro rata distribution "out of its earnings and
profits" by an ongoing corporation in the ordinary course of busi-
ness is a dividend and must be included in a shareholder's gross
income without allowance for recovery of the cost of the shares.1
Additionally, while the gain on a sale of shares is capital gain, a
dividend is ordinary income.
The issue of whether the sale of shares to an issuer shall be
treated as a dividend or as received in exchange for a capital asset
has troubled Congress, courts, and commentators since the Reve-
nue Act of 1913. If a corporation redeems some of its shares or
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama. B.A., University of the South,
1970; J.D., University of Texas at Austin, 1972; LL.M, Harvard University, 1977. Research
for this Article was supported by the University of Alabama Research Committee Grant
Number 1070.
1. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316(a). In this Article all distributions are out of, or covered by, earn-
ings and profits except when otherwise stated.
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distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation, the transaction
is generally described as having the characteristics of a dividend to
the extent the distribution is "out of earnings and profits" and the
characteristics of a sale to the extent that it terminates the equity
interest of the redeemed party.2 In light of the existence of equally
compelling analogies, each suggesting the opposite treatment, it
has been suggested that in determining the appropriate treatment
of distributions in complete liquidation or redemption, analogizing
the transaction to a sale or a dividend is of limited value.8
A critical error permeates this analysis. The assumption is
made that to the extent that a corporate distribution is "out of
earnings and profits," the distribution is analogous to a dividend.
This assumption leads proponents of reform to suggest dividend
treatment, or its equivalent, for distributions in redemption of
some or all of a corporation's shares.4 Meaningful suggestions for
reform must, however, begin with an understanding of when a dis-
tribution is, or is not, analogous to a dividend under the present
system-that is, with an understanding of how one must define a
dividend to comport with the fundaments of the present system.5
This Article suggests that although one part of a corporate
distribution may be analogous to a sale and the remainder to a
dividend, there is no overlap of, or competition between, analogies.
This lack of overlap is apparent when one realizes that a dividend
and a sale are methods of realizing different types of gain, rather
than alternative methods of realizing the same type of gain. This
Article examines the basic conceptual model underlying the pre-
sent system of taxing corporate distributions, describes the appro-
priate treatment of corporate distributions that is suggested by an
understanding of the underlying concepts, and indicates the dis-
2. Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 9 STAN. L. REv. 13, 14 (1956); Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and
the Income Tax, 5 TAx. L. Rzv. 437, 448-50 (1950); Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and
Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 749
(1969); Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax
Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Cohen et al.]; Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Dividends in Liqui-
dations, 23 MICH. L. Rzv. 565, 566-68 (1925).
3. ALI FEDERAL INcoME TAX PROJECT. SUBCHAPTER C CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 94
(Tent. Draft No. 2 1979) [hereinafter cited as ALI TAX PROJECT].
4. See, e.g., id. at 100-58; Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study:
Acquisitions and Distributions, 33 TAx LAw. 743, 764-66, 772 (1979).
5. For a discussion of the importance of understanding the basic underlying principles
of corporate taxation, see Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statu-
tory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 93 (1977).
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crepancies between the present Code and this model.
While the rules governing corporate distributions may be
stated in the abstract, they have no life or meaning except in rela-
tion to real corporations and their investors. Therefore, to illus-
trate the points discussed herein reference will be made periodi-
cally to transactions involving the following described
hypothetical: X Corporation was organized in Year One. On Janu-
ary 1 of each year since Year Nine it has had a net book value of
$10,000,000, which consisted of $1,000,000 in contributed capital
and $9,000,000 in retained earnings and profits. Since Year Ten
the reasonable, present business needs of X Corporation have re-
quired the retention of $9,000,000 of earnings and profits, but no
more. Each year since Year Ten X Corporation has had earnings
and profits of $1,000,000 and has at year end distributed pro rata
to its shareholders this amount of money. Since Year Ten the mar-
ket has valued X Corporation shares at approximately ten times
earnings, or $10 per share. X Corporation has 1,000,000 outstand-
ing shares. Individual A has owned 10,000 of the shares of X cor-
poration since its formation. A's basis for his shares is $10,000. In-
dividual B has owned 10,000 of the shares of X Corporation since
Year Ten. B's basis for his shares is $100,000.
II. DIVIDENDS AN SALES
On December 31, Year Eleven, X Corporation distributes
$1,000,000 pro rata to its shareholders as a dividend. On January 1,
Year Twelve, A and B each receive $100,000 in exchange for their
shares. If A and B receive such amounts through sale of their
shares to new investors, the transaction has always been treated as
an exchange with the result that A has income to the extent of his
$90,000 gain, and B has no gain and no income. The question
raised here is whether the result should be different if such
amounts are received from the corporation in redemption of their
shares.
The early revenue acts provide an appropriate starting point
to address this issue. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1918 no statute
expressly dealt with distributions in redemption. Both the Reve-
nue Act of 1913 and the Revenue Act of 1916 included "dividends"
as an item of income.6 A distribution out of earnings and profits
6. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § H
B, 38 Stat 167.
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was a dividend. 7 A sale of shares was an exchange transaction re-
sulting in income only to the extent of gain. To determine whether
a distribution in partial or complete liquidation would be charac-
terized as a dividend or an exchange transaction under the Reve-
nue Acts of 1913 and 1916 requires an understanding of the rela-
tionship between, and the nature of, a dividend and a sale of
shares. To reach this understanding, one must consider a number
of questions. For example, what is a dividend? Why is exchange
treatment afforded to sales? To what extent can the proceeds of a
sale of shares be considered a realization of undistributed earnings
and profits? Should any portion of the proceeds of a sale of shares
be treated as a dividend?
Consider first the sale by A. On January 1, Year Twelve, A's
share of X Corporation's contributed capital is $10,000, and his
share of undistributed earnings and profits is $90,000. The market
value of his shares is $100,000. Therefore, A has an unrealized gain
attributable to his share of undistributed earnings and profits that
may be realized by sale of his shares.8 Indeed, since X Corporation
must retain all of its earnings and profits to meet the needs of its
business,9 A's unrealized gain can be realized only by selling his
shares. Can A be treated as having received his gain out of earn-
ings and profits when X Corporation has no distributable assets?
A source of distributable funds is provided by the purchaser.
We can view the new investor as contributing the $100,000
7. The Revenue Act of 1913 contained no definition of "dividends." The Revenue Act
of 1916 defined "dividends" as "any distribution ... out of its earnings or profits accrued
since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen." Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39
Stat. 757. In Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918), the Supreme Court defined "dividends,"
as used in the Revenue Act of 1913, to include ordinary distributions out of earnings and
profits whenever earned. Id. at 344.
8. A simple model is being used for our initial inquiry. See Part I supra. The model
assumes that the book value of the corporation's assets remains constant and is identical to
the fair market value of these assets. Moreover, it assumes that the value of the enterprise
as a going concern is equal to the value, in the aggregate, of those assets that constitute the
business of the corporation (operating assets, including needed working capital). Accord-
ingly, the total value of the corporation should it be liquidated is equal to the sum of its
undistributed earnings and profits and its contributed capital. In real life the intersection of
enterprise value, asset value, and the historic value of the corporation's contributed capital
and undistributed earnings and profits would be rare. The consequence of this lack of inter-
section and of the significance of the earnings and profits concept is discussed at note 87
infra. For now it is enough to note that this simple model allows us to speak of a distribu-
tion "out of earnings and profits" with the comfortable understanding that the reference is
to a distribution of assets constituting the tangible resting place of the same amount of the
corporation's previously undistributed net profit.
9. Generally, this Article uses the term "needed earnings and profits" to describe that
portion of earnings and profits that must be retained to meet the needs of the business.
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purchase price to X Corporation, which simultaneously, redeems
A's shares and reissues them to the new investor. So viewed, the
transaction can be characterized as a distribution to A by the cor-
poration of his pro rata share of earnings and profits ($90,000) and
a return of his pro rata share of contributed capital ($10,000).
The sale by B presents a different situation. B is in the same
position as the new investor who purchased A's shares. We must
treat B as originally having contributed $100,000 (his basis) to X
Corporation to enable it to redeem a prior investor. Thus, even if
the amount realized by B is treated as passed through X Corpora-
tion, this sum does not represent a distribution out of earnings and
profits, but rather a return of his previously invested capital.
This analysis confirms the conclusion that exchange treatment
is the appropriate way to determine the amount of income result-
ing from a sale of shares. It shows that, to the extent of the seller's
pro rata share of earnings and profits, the gain on a sale of shares
(as opposed to the total amount realized) can be considered to be
"out of earnings and profits." The question remains, however,
whether the gain on a sale of shares should be characterized as a
dividend to the extent it is deemed to be out of earnings and
profits.
The next step, then, must be to determine when a distribution
out of earnings and profits is a dividend. In the absence of a statu-
tory answer, the Supreme Court interpreted the term "dividends"
in the Revenue Act of 1913 to mean "the tangible and recurrent
returns upon. . . stock, analogous to the interest and rent received
upon other forms of invested capital."10 A dividend, the Court
noted, "demonstrates the capacity of the corporation to pay divi-
dends, holds out a promise of further dividends in the future, and
quite probably increases the market value of the shares."'1 Inter-
preting the statutory definition of dividends in the Revenue Act of
1918,12 the Court described a dividend as "the recurrent return
upon stock paid to stockholders by a going corporation in the ordi-
nary course of business, which does not reduce their stockholdings
and leaves them in a position to enjoy future returns upon the
same stock."13
Could a distribution out of earnings and profits needed by the
business be a dividend within the Supreme Court's definition? If a
10. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1918).
11. Id. at 346.
12. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 201(c), 40 Stat. 1059 (1919).
13. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233, 237 (1928).
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corporation distributes assets needed by the business, the business
will suffer and earning capacity will be reduced. Rather than dem-
onstrating that future dividends can be expected, the distribution
would impair capital and reduce share value. By contrast consider
the yearly distribution by X Corporation of the $1,000,000 that is
attributable to surplus earnings and profits of the year. These dis-
tributions are in the nature of a recurrent return on capital, rather
than a return of capital. They do demonstrate the earning capacity
of the corporation and leave the shareholder in a position to expect
future dividends.
This suggests that corporate earnings and profits may be di-
vided conceptually into two distinct elements-surplus earnings
and profits and needed earnings and profits.1 Surplus earnings
and profits-those in excess of the needs of the business-can be
distributed, and these distributions should be dividends. Indeed,
Congress has always sought to compel the distribution of surplus
earnings and profits.15 Needed earnings and profits, however, are
entirely different. In the ordinary course of business, the gain rep-
resented by needed earnings and profits can only be realized by a
sale of shares, and this gain cannot fairly be characterized as a div-
idend. Therefore, only surplus earnings and profits, not the total
undistributed earnings and profits, constitute a reservoir from
which the government expects future dividends.16
It is necessary to analyze one final situation before moving to a
consideration of nondividend distributions-a sale of shares at a
time when the corporation has surplus earnings and profits. For
instance, suppose that on December 31, Year Eleven, immediately
before the declaration of the annual dividend, B sells his shares12
14. Thus, in our simple model, the needed earnings and profits of X Corporation are
$9,000,000. Its annual earnings of $1,000,000, which are not needed in the business, are sur-
plus earnings and profits.
15. The Revenue Act of 1913 contained the predecessor of our present accumulated
earnings tax. Included in the taxable income of an individual was his share of corporate
earnings and profits "that are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the
business." Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § H1 A(2), 38 Stat. 166. The accumulated earnings
tax now imposes a penalty tax on corporations that accumulate earnings and profits for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders that would result from
distribution. I.R.C. § 532(a). Improper purpose is indicated when accumulations are shown
to be "beyond the reasonable needs of the business." I.R.C. § 533(a).
16. Many commentators err in viewing the entire undistributed earnings and profits
account as a reservoir from which future dividends can be expected. See generally ALI TAX
PRojEcT, supra note 3, at 100-58; Beghe, supra note 4, at 764-66, 772.
17. Assume for our purposes that the dividend is paid to the person owning a share at
the moment in time when a dividend is declared.
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At the time of sale, B's pro rata share of surplus earnings and prof-
its is $10,000. If B receives $110,000 for his shares, it might seem
appropriate to characterize $10,000 of the proceeds as a dividend,
and the remainder as a return of capital.
There are problems with this characterization, however. It is
unlikely that a purchaser would be willing to "loan" B $10,000 in-
terest free for the period of time between the purchase date and
the date of delivery of the dividend. It is also likely that a pur-
chaser would require some compensation for the risk that the divi-
dend would not be declared. Clearly a purchaser would require a
discount for interest and risk.
Different problems would arise if B were to sell his shares for
only $108. For example, would B have a $10 dividend and a $2 loss
on the sale of his shares, or an $8 dividend, or an $8 gain? The
problem involved is central to the entire concept of capitalgains-how to separate recurrent profits from the gain on the dis-
position of capital. ' s
The difficulty increases when one considers sales of shares
during the year. Must a portion of the gain on each transaction be
characterized as a dividend to the extent of the seller's allocable
share of any dividend actually issued? What if the price fluctuates
widely during the year in a manner that does not fairly reflect the
accumulation of a distributable surplus?19 These complexities
serve to reinforce the central point-unlike needed earnings and
profits, surplus earnings and profits can be distributed. A share-
holder expects them to be distributed, and Congress has always
done its best to require that they be distributed. 0 Should we not
then await the actual distribution of surplus earnings and profits
and treat this distribution as a dividend in full to the actual
recipient?
The Supreme Court sanctioned this result in United States v.
Phellis.21 The Court described the position of B's purchaser who
receives a dividend shortly after the purchase from B:
In buying at a price that reflected the accumulated profits, he of course ac-
quired as a part of the valuable rights purchased the prospect of a dividend
from the accumulations-bought "dividend on," as the phrase goes-and nec-
essarily took subject to the burden of the income tax proper to be assessed
against him by reason of the dividend if and when made. He simply stepped
18. See M. DAVID, ALTERNATIV APPROACHES To CAPrrAL GAINs TAxATION 25-28 (1968);
Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARv. L. Rsv. 985 (1956).
19. See Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 23.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
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into the shoes, in this as in other respects, of the stockholder whose shares he
acquired, and presumably the prospect of a dividend influenced the price
paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an income tax to be paid
thereon. In short, the question whether a dividend made out of company
profits constitutes income of the stockholder is not affected by antecedent
transfers of the stock from hand to hand.2
A sale of shares, then, is the vehicle by which a shareholder
realizes gain attributable to needed earnings and profits and as-
signs the right to receive future dividends. A dividend is a distribu-
tion made in the ordinary course of business out of surplus earn-
ings and profits, which leaves the value of the underlying
enterprise unaffected.
III. DISTRIBUTIONS IN COMPLETE LIQUIDATION
A. The Proper Analogy to Sales
If a sale is properly entitled to exchange treatment and repre-
sents the method of realizing needed earnings and profits, and if a
dividend is a distribution of surplus earnings and profits in the or-
dinary course of business by an ongoing corporation, how should
one characterize a distribution in complete liquidation? Consider
the complete liquidation of X Corporation on January 1, Year
Twelve. Having declared no dividend at year end, X Corporation
distributes $110,000 to A and $110,000 to B.
These distributions are literally out of earnings and profits to
the extent of $100,000. B purchased his shares, however, for
$100,000, which capitalized the portion of the liquidating distribu-
tion attributable to needed earnings and profits. 3 While A did not
sell his shares prior to receiving the distribution in liquidation, he
could have realized the gain attributable to needed earnings and
profits by sale. Therefore, equity, and the analogy to sales treat-
ment, requires that A be allowed to treat $100,000 of the liquidat-
ing distribution as received in exchange for his shares.
The analogy to sales treatment breaks down when applied to
the portion of the liquidating distribution attributable to surplus
earnings and profits. Both A and B have received $10,000, which is
attributable to surplus earnings and profits. An investor purchases
shares with the understanding that the corporation will distribute
surplus earnings and profits periodically and that the distribution
will be treated as a dividend in full.2 4 Unlike a sale, the corporation
22. Id. at 171-72.
23. See text accompanying notes 8-19 supra.
24. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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makes an actual distribution of surplus earnings and profits. Un-
like a sale, no new investor exists who will ultimately receive the
surplus earnings and profits as a dividend. Unlike a sale, no prob-
lem of multitudinous transactions and imprecise market valuation
occurs.25 Therefore, the portion of a liquidating distribution attrib-
utable to surplus earnings and profits should be treated as a
dividend.
Determining the appropriate treatment of liquidating distribu-
tions by analogy has been criticized because the liquidating distri-
bution, in its entirety, seems analogous to both a sale and a divi-
dend.2 ' When one recognizes the bifurcated nature of earnings and
profits, it is clear that a liquidating distribution can be in part a
dividend and in part a sale.2 The problem, then, lies in trying to
characterize the entire distribution as either a dividend or a sale.
The history of congressional attempts to place liquidating distribu-
tions properly within the basic framework demonstrates that the
bifurcated nature of earnings and profits has not been perceived.
B. The Historical Treatment
The Revenue Acts of 1913 and 1916 contained no provision
explicitly governing liquidating distributions. The Acts defined
dividends as distributions out of earnings and profits.28 Although a
liquidating distribution would literally be out of earnings and prof-
its and would thus be a dividend, the foregoing analysis indicates
that a literal reading would be incorrect.29
The Bureau of Internal Revenue interpreted a liquidating dis-
tribution as analogous to a sale rather than a dividend under the
1913 and 1916 Acts, because it constituted a distribution of "not
only the surplus earnings of the M Company, but all of its capital,
which could not be done by an ordinary dividend."30 Thus, the
amount of income was the gain, the excess of amount realized over
basis.3 1
After the Bureau had issued its interpretation, however, three
25. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
26. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 3, at 94; B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORA77oNS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 11.01 (4th ed. 1979).
27. If X Corporation distributes its annual dividend, leaving it with no surplus earn-
ings and profits, and then liquidates, the liquidating distribution is, of course, completely
analogous to a sale.
28. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
29. See Part III, Section A supra.
30. T.B.R. 45, 1 C.B. 19 (1919).
31. S. 971, 1 C.B. 79 (1919).
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courts rendered decisions against the Bureau. Because of these de-
cisions one commentator characterized a liquidating distribution as
a dividend under the 1913 and 1916 Acts to the extent that it was
out of earnings and profits.32  All three cases 3 involved original
shareholders like A. The portion of the distribution attributable to
earnings and profits was, therefore, not in excess of the share-
holder's gain. The cases are not inconsistent with the Bureau's po-
sition, or the above analysis: gain is still the amount of income re-
sulting from a liquidating distribution. The question involved in
these cases was "simply" whether that gain should be character-
ized as a dividend.
As the amount of income was not at issue in these cases, one
might question the taxpayer's insistence on characterizing the gain
as a dividend rather than as the product of a sale. The answer,
often overlooked in light of the present treatment of dividends, '34 is
the preferential tax treatment dependent on dividend characteriza-
tion. In the Revenue Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1918, it was prefera-
ble, from the taxpayer's viewpoint, to characterize the income as a
dividend. The Acts exempted dividends from the normal tax35
while imposing both the normal tax and a surtax on gains from
sales.36
The Revenue Act of 1918 expressly adopted the Bureau's posi-
tion that liquidating distributions should be treated as sales.3 7 The
Revenue Act of 1921, however, included neither a provision explic-
itly covering liquidating distributions nor an explanation for this
omission. In the absence of an expression of congressional intent to
the contrary, it might be expected that the Bureau would have
continued under the Revenue Act of 1921 to treat liquidating dis-
32. Darrell, Corporate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. PA. L. Rav.
907, 908 (1941). See also Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 450; Bruce, Liquidations and
Reorganizations: Madison Square Garden and Kass, 30 TAX L. Rav. 303, 306-07 (1975).
33. Vincent v. McLaughlin, 61 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1932); A.B. Nickey & Sons, 3 B.T.A.
173 (1925); James Dobson, 1 B.T.A. 1082 (1925).
34. This historical quirk is generally overlooked. The consequence is an analysis of the
evolution of our present system based on the incorrect assumption that dividend characteri-
zation has always been an anathema to individual taxpayers and sought after by the Service.
See Bruce, supra note 32, at 306-07, 310-11; Clark, supra note 5, at 100, 106.
35. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 216(a), 40 Stat. 1069 (1919); Revenue Act of 1916,
ch. 463, § 5(b), 39 Stat. 759; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II B, 38 Stat. 167.
36. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 211(a), 40 Stat. 1062 (1919); Revenue Act of 1916,
ch. 463, § 1(b), 39 Stat. 756; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § A(2), 38 Stat. 166.
37. The Revenue Act of 1918 provided that "[a]mounts distributed in the liquidation
of a corporation shall be treated as payments in exchange for stock or shares, and any gain
or profit realized thereby shall be taxed to the distributee as other gain or profits" rather
than as dividends. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 201(c), 40 Stat. 1059 (1919).
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tributions as sales of shares, just as they had done under the Reve-
nue Acts of 1913 and 1916, which also contained no provision ex-
plicitly governing distributions in complete liquidation. As under
the earlier Acts, the Bureau treated only the gain on liquidating
distributions as income. The Bureau, however, took the position
that this gain was to be characterized as a dividend exempt from
the normal tax, rather than as gain from the sale of shares subject
to both the normal tax and surtax.3 8
Thus, the Bureau interpreted the Revenue Act of 1921 differ-
ently from the Revenue Act of 1916, although neither of the Acts
expressly exclude liquidating distributions from the dividend defi-
nition, and both of the Acts are devoid of legislative history indi-
cating congressional intent. Perhaps it is not too cynical to suggest
that the Bureau, charged with the responsibility to collect the rev-
enue, would naturally interpret ambiguous language in a manner
designed to produce the greatest revenue., 9 It is important to re-
member that the Revenue Act of 1921 contained the first capital
gains preference.40 The ball game had changed; the recipient of a
liquidating distribution would now, in most cases, receive the most
preferable tax treatment by characterizing his gain as gain from
the sale of shares, rather than as a dividend.41
It is understandable that taxpayers prior to 1921 would at-
tempt to treat gains from liquidating distributions as dividends,
and after 192142 as the proceeds of a sale of stock. It is perhaps
also understandable, although regrettable, that the Bureau would
38. Regulations promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1921 defined distributions in
liquidation as follows:
Where a corporation distributes all of its property in complete liquidation or dissolu-
tion, the gain realized by the stockholder from the transaction, computed under section
202, is taxable as a dividend to the extent that it is paid out of earnings or profits of
the corporation accumulated since February 28, 1913. If the amount received by the
stockholder in liquidation is less than the cost or other basis of the stock, a deductible
loss is sustained.
Regulation 62, T.D. 3295 (1922) (construing Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201, art. 1545,
42 Stat. 228).
39. For a good discussion of the role that the natural tendencies of taxpayers and the
Service play in the development of corporate taxation, see Clark, supra note 5, at 94-96.
40. The Revenue Act of 1924 provided an optional tax of 122 % on "capital net gain"
in lieu of the normal tax and surtax otherwise payable. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §
208(b), 43 Stat. 263.
41. For net incomes in excess of $8,000 the normal tax was 6%, and for net incomes in
excess of $500,000 the surtax was 40%. Lesser rates were applicable to net incomes below
these amounts. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 210, 211(a), 43 Stat. 264.
42. The exemption of dividend income from the normal tax, which was of little conse-
quence after 1921, ended in 1936.
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take the contrary position. If the Bureau had had the foresight and
wisdom to characterize liquidating distributions under either the
1921 Act or the earlier Acts as analogous in some respects to sales,
but in other respects to dividends, much of the later difficulty in
the characterization and treatment of partial liquidations and cor-
porate separations might have been avoided. Of course, to be fair,
the Bureau may not have realized the nature of the problem. To
analyze the issue properly, two distinct questions must be an-
swered. First, should capital gain be taxed preferentially?43 Sec-
ond, what portion of a liquidating distribution, if any, is capital
gain? It is apparent that these questions are often not separated."4
In any event, the Bureau failed to comprehend the complexity
of the issue before it. The Bureau's interpretation was inequitable
to a shareholder in A's position. It would require A to treat
$100,000 of the liquidating distribution as a dividend, but would
require B to treat only $10,000 as such. If A had sold prior to the
distribution, however, he could have treated his gain as capital
gain. Moreover, B could avoid dividend treatment entirely by sell-
ing his shares for $110,000 immediately before the liquidation. In
1924 Congress reacted to the Bureau's interpretation by again ex-
pressly providing for the treatment of distributions in complete
liquidation, in their entirety, as sales of shares.45
Since 1924, except for a brief hiatus between 1934 and 1936,"
Congress has always treated distributions in complete liquidation
as sales of shares. Never has Congress treated the gain on distribu-
tions in complete liquidation as a dividend, in part or in full.' v
This failure to provide dividend treatment to the portion of a liq-
uidating distribution that is out of surplus earnings and profits has
infected the entire statutory structure governing corporate
distributions.
43. The propriety of a capital gains preference is beyond the scope of this Article. For
a good discussion of this issue, see M. DAvD, supra note 18, at 37-38; 73 YALE L.J. 693, 695-
701 (1964).
44. See, e.g., Chommie, Section 346(a)(2): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. Rav.
407, 407 (1956).
45. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255.
46. The Revenue Act of 1934 treated distributions in complete liquidation as short
term capital gain. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 115(c), 48 Stat. 711. The Revenue Act of
1936 again made distributions in complete liquidation eligible for sales treatment in full.
Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1687.
47. The current code provides that "[a]mounts distributed in complete liquidation of
a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock." I.R.C. § 331(a).
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IV. PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS AND REDEMPTIONS
A. Background
Consider the situation of a corporation that makes a distribu-
tion out of earnings and profits in exchange for some of its out-
standing shares but not in complete liquidation. Such a "partial"
liquidation was literally a dividend under the Revenue Acts of
1913, 1916, and 1921 to the extent that it was made out of earnings
and profits.48 The Revenue Act of 1918 expressly accorded ex-
change treatment to liquidating distributions,'49 and the Bureau in-
terpreted this as applying to a partial liquidation. 0 The Bureau
again treated partial liquidations like complete liquidations under
the Revenue Act of 1921. 51 The Acts provided no guidelines for
determining when a transaction should be characterized as a par-
tial liquidation. In keeping with the favorable revenue conse-
quences, the Bureau may well have characterized any transaction
involving a redemption of shares as a partial liquidation. 2
Partial liquidations first received express statutory status in
the Revenue Act of 1924. The Act treated distributions in partial
liquidation like sales of shares5" and defined partial liquidations as
distributions "in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of
its stock."" Concerned that taxpayers were disguising dividends as
partial liquidations to obtain both exchange and capital gains
treatment, Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1926, provided divi-
dend treatment to distributions in redemption that were "essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend."55 In 1934 Congress relegated to
short-term capital gain status the gain on partial and complete liq-
uidations.8 8 Although Congress restored gains on complete liquida-
tion to the status of other sales of shares in 1936, 57 gains on partial
liquidation were not again accorded long-term capital gains treat-
ment until 1942.8
Prior to 1954, as the courts struggled with the definition of
48. See notes 6-7 supra; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(a), 42 Stat. 228; Murphy,
Partial Liquidations and the New Look, 5 TAX L. Rav. 73, 74 (1949).
49. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 201(c), 40 Stat. 1059 (1919).
50. O.D. 488, 2 C.B. 29 (1920).
51. I.T. 1543, 11-1 C.B. 17 (1923).
52. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
53. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255.
54. Id. at § 201(g), 43 Stat. 255.
55. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11.
56. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 115(c), 48 Stat. 711.
57. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1687.
58. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 147, 56 Stat. 841.
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partial liquidation, 59 two criteria seemed to emerge. If a "genuine
contraction of the business" occurred, then even a pro rata distri-
bution in redemption was a partial liquidation. If a distribution
was sufficiently non pro rata, then it constituted a partial liquida-
tion.6 1 A third, generally discredited, approach treated a redemp-
tion like a sale if no cancellation of shares occurred.62
The Revenue Act of 1954 brought some order to the area. Sec-
tions 331 and 346 govern partial liquidations involving the contrac-
tion concept. Section 302 governs those distributions in redemp-
tion involving the non pro rata concept. Under the 1954 Act a
distribution in partial liquidation is entitled to exchange treat-
ment. 3 The Act defines a distribution in redemption as a partial
liquidation if it "is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."" The
legislative history indicates that the appropriate inquiry is whether
the distribution is in connection with "a genuine contraction of the
business." 5 Section 346(b) provides a safe harbor for any distribu-
tion in redemption that is attributable to the cessation of one of
two trades or businesses, each of which has been actively con-
ducted by the corporation for the prior five years.6 A distribution
in redemption, whether or not in connection with a genuine con-
traction of a business, is entitled to exchange treatment under sec-
tion 3027 if the transaction is sufficiently non pro rata.' Safe
harbors are provided for redemptions that completely terminate or
substantially reduce a shareholder's interest in the corporation. 69
While sections 346 and 302 provide more certainty for tax
planning and more guidance in determining when exchange treat-
ment will be extended, no clear rationale for the distinctions is ar-
ticulated. What is the underlying rationale of these sections? Are
sections 346 and 302 consistent with the underlying rationale? If
59. See Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 455-80; Chommie, supra note 44.
60. Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 471-73; Chommie, supra note 44, at 417-22.
61. Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 469.
62. Id. at 458-65.
63. I.R.C. § 331(a)(2).
64. I.R.C. § 346(a)(2).
65. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1954).
66. I.R.C. § 346(b).
67. The Internal Revenue Code states that "[fif a corporation redeems its stock.
and if paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be
treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock." I.R.C. § 302(a).
68. The Internal Revenue Code states, "Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is
not essentially equivalent to a dividend." I.R.C. § 302(b). This hurdle cannot be cleared if
the distribution is pro rata. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
69. I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(2)-(5), 302(c).
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not, what is the proper treatment? To answer these questions one
must build on the foundation provided by a proper understanding
of the nature of a dividend and of the difference between gain at-
tributable to surplus earnings and profits and gain attributable to
needed earnings and profits. 0
B. Partial Liquidations and Section 346
The analogy between distributions in partial liquidation and
distributions in complete liquidation provides the basis for ex-
tending exchange treatment to distributions in partial liquidation.
The argument is made that exchange treatment must be allowed
when a corporation terminates one of two businesses, each carried
on since the formation of the corporation. The basis for this argu-
ment is that the terminated business could have been separately
incorporated and the complete liquidation of the separate corpora-
tion would have been treated as an exchange transaction. 1 When
one accepts this premise that some distributions in partial liquida-
tion are entitled to exchange treatment, the question becomes one
of deciding which distributions are in partial liquidation.
There has been considerable reluctance, however, to accept
the premise that any partial liquidation is entitled to exchange
treatment. On one level the refusal is based on the belief that any
pro rata distribution out of earnings and profits is a dividend;7 2 the
proper inquiry, however, is whether the distribution is out of sur-
plus earnings and profits.78 On a second level, the original incorpo-
ration analogy is challenged both as an attempt to rewrite history
and as unpersuasive when applied to a contraction of a single
business.74
An evaluation of the proper treatment of distributions attribu-
table to the termination of one of two businesses necessarily re-
quires one to consider the situation if the business had been sepa-
rately incorporated. The mere fact that the businesses could have
been separately incorporated, however, is of no importance. To il-
70. See note 16 supra and accompanying text; Part IlI, Section A supra.
71. See Nolan, The Uncertain Tax Treatment of Stock Redemptions: A Legislative
Proposal, 65 Hnv. L. REv. 255, 264-65 (1951).
72. See, e.g., Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 476. "Dividends are distributions of
earnings and profits to the stockholders which do not change their proportionate interests in
the corporation. Any distribution in cancellation or redemption of some of the corporation's
stock which meets this test should be [treated as a dividend]." (footnote omitted). Id.
73. See discussion in Part I supra.
74. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 38.
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lustrate let us consider two hypothetical distributions made by X
Corporation. 5
Situation No. 1: X Corporation from the outset has carried on
two separate and distinct businesses, one the manufacture and sale
of brushes, the other the manufacture and sale of soap. Each busi-
ness uses one-half of the original capital and one-half of the
needed earnings and profits. Thus, the market values each business
at $5,000,000, of which $500,000 is attributable to original capital
and $4,500,000 to needed earnings and profits. Each business gen-
erates $500,000 in surplus earnings and profits each year. Each
business generates all of the needed earnings and profits of that
business.
Situation No. 2: X Corporation from the outset has carried on
two separate and distinct businesses, one the manufacture and sale
of brushes, the other the owning and operating of a resort hotel.
The corporation invested its original capital in the brush business
and purchased the hotel for $5,000,000, with the purchase price to-
tally deferred and payable in ten equal annual installments of
principal. The hotel note required interest to be paid in equal an-
nual installments over the ten-year life of the note. The brush bus-
iness annually generated $1,000,000 in earnings and profits. The
hotel business annually generated sufficient gross income to exactly
cover its operating expenses and the interest due on the hotel note.
Thus, the hotel business had no annual earnings and profits. The
corporation used $500,000 of the earnings and profits of the brush
business each year to make the principal payment due on the hotel
note. Through Year Eight the brush business needed and thus re-
tained the remaining earnings and profits.
At the beginning of Year Eleven, X Corporation distributes
pro rata to its shareholders $5,000,000. In Situation No. 1 the dis-
tribution represents the proceeds of the sale of the soap business.
In Situation No. 2 the distribution represents the proceeds of the
sale of the hotel. Should these distributions be entitled to ex-
change treatment? Are they analogous to distributions in complete
liquidation?
In Situation No. 1 the two businesses could have been placed
in separate corporations at the outset. At the beginning of Year
Eleven, the separate corporation housing the soap business could
distribute $5,000,000 to its shareholders in complete liquidation.
This distribution would have been attributable entirely to original
75. See description in Part I supra.
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capital and needed earnings and profits, and the recipients would
be entitled to exchange treatment. 7 Thus, the identical distribu-
tion in partial liquidation should be entitled to exchange
treatment.
In Situation No. 2 the two businesses could also have been
placed in separate corporations at the outset. At the beginning of
Year Eleven, the separate corporation housing the hotel business
could not distribute $5,000,000 to its shareholders in complete liq-
uidation. Without the diversion of surplus earnings and profits
from the brush business, no payments of principal could have been
made on the hotel note. The hotel remains fully encumbered. The
corporation housing the hotel has nothing of value to distribute.
The distribution in Situation No. 2, then, is not analogous to a
distribution in complete liquidation. The surplus earnings and
profits of the brush business have been temporarily stored in the
form of a hotel. They remain surplus earnings and profits of the
brush business and should be treated as a dividend when
distributed.
Commentators have criticized the safe harbor test of section
346(b) because it fails to insure the genuineness of a contraction
and thus allows planned conversion of dividends into distributions
that will be entitled to exchange and capital gains treatment." As
demonstrated by our analysis of Situation No. 1 and Situation No.
2, this criticism is valid because section 346(b) fails to distinguish
between a distribution that could have occurred if the terminated
business had been separately incorporated 78 and a distribution
that merely represents a distribution of surplus earnings and prof-
its of the nonterminated business. Thus, it invites a corporation to
use surplus earnings and profits to purchase or create a separate
business for later distribution in an exchange transaction qualify-
ing for capital gains treatment.
The question that logically arises at this point is whether there
can be a distribution in partial liquidation that qualifies for ex-
change treatment when the corporation conducts only one busi-
ness. Consider three hypothetical distributions made by X
76. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
77. Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law
Institute Tax Project-American Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revi-
sions, 14 TAx L. Rv. 1, 6-7 (1958).
78. In other words, the distribution must be out of original capital invested in the





Distribution No. 1: In Year Twelve and Year Thirteen X Cor-
poration paid no dividends, retaining its surplus earnings and prof-
its of those years for planned expansion. The corporation aban-
doned the plans in Year Fourteen and distributed pro rata to its
shareholders the $2,000,000 attributable to the now unneeded ex-
pansion reserve.
Distribution No. 2: X Corporation operates a clothing store.
Because of the advancing age and decreasing ambitions of its prin-
cipals, X Corporation relocates to a smaller location, thereby re-
ducing the scale of its business. A proportionate reduction in both
earning capacity and capital needs results, and the corporation dis-
tributed pro rata to its shareholders the $2,000,000 attributable to
previously needed earnings and profits.79
Distribution No. 3: X Corporation operates a clothing store. In
Year Eleven X Corporation discontinues credit sales, reducing its
working capital needs by $2,000,000, but leaving its earning capac-
ity and underlying enterprise value unchanged. X Corporation dis-
tributes the $2,000,000 of previously needed earnings and profits
pro rata to its shareholders.
To analogize these distributions to distributions in complete
liquidation is inappropriate because X Corporation conducts oly
one business. The appropriate analogy is to sales of shares in a
corporation whose existence is not being terminated. The appropri-
ate question is whether the distribution is of surplus earnings and
profits or of needed earnings and profits that can only be realized,
in the ordinary course of business, by sale.
A dividend is a distribution out of surplus earnings and profits
that leaves the shareholder in a position to expect future profits.80
By contrast, the gain attributable to needed earnings and profits
can only be realized by sale of shares, because the distribution of
needed assets would reduce the earning capacity of the corpora-
tion.81 Earnings and profits, then, are deemed to be needed, rather
than surplus, if their distribution would adversely affect the value
of the corporation as a going enterprise.
So viewed, the proper characterization of the distributions in
the first and second examples is clear. The distribution of a reserve
79. Compare these facts with those in Estate of Chandler v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.
1158 (1954).




for expansion, 2 as in Distribution No. 1, would have no impact on
underlying enterprise value. A purchaser of shares buys "dividend
on" with respect to such retained earnings and profits."' Only if
the expansion takes place will the reserve be converted into needed
earnings and profits.8 ' Distribution No. 2, however, does propor-
tionately reduce underlying enterprise value and is, therefore, enti-
tled to exchange treatment.
Distribution No. 3 should be treated no differently from Dis-
tribution No. 1. The only difference between these situations is
that the corporation 'attributes Distribution No. 1 to assets that
never became a part of the underlying enterprise, but attributes
Distribution No. 3 to assets that at one time were a part of the
underlying enterprise. The essence of a dividend, however, is a dis-
tribution that leaves underlying enterprise value unaffected. Dis-
tribution No. 3 is no different from the distribution of any prop-
erty that is no longer needed in the business and can be
distributed without harm to the enterprise.
Despite the soundness of the above conclusion, the corporate-
shareholder tax area is so infected with inquiry into intent and
purpose,s necessitated by the imperfections in the statutory
scheme, that one is certain to hear the following objection:
No bad motive underlay Distribution No. 3. X Corporation retained earnings
for a legitimate business purpose. They actually used these assets in the busi-
ness. Surely Distribution No. 3 is different from Distribution No. 1, in which
the claimed motive of retaining earnings for future expansion is possibly sus-
pect, and in any event did not result in that expansion.
This focus on motive is wrong. The focus must be the effect of the
distribution on the enterprise and the reasonable expectations of
investors. An investor who buys X Corporation stock for $10 per
share, in effect, capitalizes retained earnings to the extent of the
purchase price. 86 This investor expects future distribution of sur-
82. Although no rationale is given, evidence exists of congressional intent not to treat
this type of distribution as a partial liquidation. "It is intended that a genuine contraction
of the business as under present law will result in partial liquidation .... However, a dis-
tribution of a reserve for expansion is not a partial liquidation." S. RF'. No. 1622, supra
note 65, at 262.
83. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
84. Thus, "needed earnings and profits" are not identical to earnings and profits that
can be retained without running afoul of the accumulated earnings tax provisions. Future
needs, or the weaknesses of the accumulated earnings tax provisions, might allow the reten-
tion of surplus earnings and profits without penalty. These earnings and profits would not
thereby become "needed earnings and profits."
85. Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 470.
86. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
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plus assets, but not of needed assets, the distribution of which
would diminish the earning capacity of X Corporation. The assets
formerly needed for the credit program are now surplus assets. X
Corporation is still worth $10 per share. The distribution of the
now surplus assets can be characterized either as a windfall profit
to X Corporation shareholders, or as the type of profit that a
shrewd investor might expect to arise occasionally in a properly
managed enterprise. In either case, the distribution can be treated
as a dividend without damaging the expectations of investors.8 7
The hostility of commentators is based, in part, on their in-
ability to define the "contraction" or "legitimate shrinkage" stan-
dard in a meaningful way and in part on their visceral certainty
that courts are reaching wrong results in applying this standard.
These commentators believe that something is wrong when a dis-
tribution attributable to the discontinuance of an unprofitable part
of a business is "held a legitimate shrinkage even though the net
sales of the corporation were increasing at the time."88 Application
of the above analysis results in dividend treatment for Distribution
87. A discussion of the utility of the phrase "out of earnings and profits" as a part of
the definition of a dividend is appropriate at this point. We have already seen that this
phrase must be understood as meaning "out of surplus" earnings and profits. See text ac-
companying notes 8-16 supra. The real inquiry is whether the distribution is of surplus
assets. Congress apparently enacted the earnings and profits requirement in 1916 out of
concern that corporate distributions attributable to presixteenth amendment gains could
not be taxed constitutionally. The Supreme Court subsequently decided that this fear was
ungrounded and made it clear that dividends under the Revenue Act of 1913 included dis-
tributions in the ordinary course of business whether out of earnings or from a mere in-
crease in value of assets. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344-46 (1918). Congress has never
expanded the dividend definition to include distributions out of unrealized appreciation,
although distributions of appreciated assets out of earnings and profits are dividends.
It often has been suggested that the earnings and profits requirement should be de-
leted, or at least amended, to included unrealized appreciation in corporate assets. For
thoughtful treatment of this issue, see Andrews, "Out of its Earnings and Profits": Some
Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1403 (1956); Blum, The Earn-
ings and Profits Limitation on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXEs 68 (1975). For
the purposes of this Article dividends will be characterized as distributions out of surplus
earnings and profits. If the earnings and profits requirement were removed, a dividend
would, of course, be a distribution of surplus assets in the ordinary course of business, which
would leave underlying enterprise value unaffected.
After Distribution No. 3, the amount realized upon the sale of X Corporation stock for
$10 per share will be attributable as follows: $1 to invested capital; $7 to needed earnings
and profits; $2 to goodwill. As previously noted, the intersection between enterprise value,
asset value, and historic value of the contributed capital and retained earnings accounts
would be rare. See note 8 supra. Thus, a reference to gain, or a portion of a distribution, as
attributable to needed earnings and profits is really a reference to the value of the needed
assets as a going enterprise, which will often reflect a premium for goodwill.
88. Bittker & Redlich, supra note 2, at 472 (footnote omitted).
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No. 3 and for distributions attributable to the cessation of unprof-
itable activities. This analysis also illuminates the underlying ra-
tionale that the commentators viscerally feel is misunderstood by
the courts and improperly reflected in the statute.
It is suggested, then, that some corporate distributions in par-
tial liquidation should be entitled to exchange treatment. The pre-
sent section 346 is seriously flawed. The safe harbor of section
346(b) allows planned conversion of ordinary income into capital
gains.89 Moreover, the general rule of section 346(a)(2) provides no
standards for determining whether distributions that do not qual-
ify for the safe harbor are "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend."
The appropriate test is twofold. First, if a distribution is of
assets comprising a separate income producing activity, then ex-
change treatment is appropriate to the extent the distribution is
out of (1) original capital invested in the terminated activity, and
(2) earnings and profits needed in, and generated by, the termi-
nated activity. Second, if the distribution is of assets that do not
comprise a separate income producing activity, then it must be
shown that the distribution is out of previously needed earnings
and profits90 and that the value of the enterprise as a going con-
cern will be reduced by an amount proportionate to the overall re-
duction in assets.
C. Redemptions and Section 302
Extending exchange status to non pro rata distributions in re-
demption has provoked less concerted attack than extending ex-
change status to pro rata distributions in partial liquidation. Per-
haps this is because the flaw in section 302 is less obvious than
that in section 346. Let us evaluate section 30291 by again consider-
ing X Corporation and its shareholders.
At the end of Year Eleven X Corporation" elects to redeem
$1,000,000 worth of its outstanding shares rather than to distribute
89. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
90. Previously needed earnings and profits are to be distinguished from needed earn-
ings and profits. See note 84 supra. If a corporation is able to replace half of its work force
with computerized machinery, thereby reducing its needed earnings and profits, but not
adversely affecting the value of the enterprise as a going concern, then any distribution out
of the earnings and profits no longer needed is a dividend.
91. This Article evaluates the appropriateness of extending exchange treatment to a
shareholder redeemed as a result of a non pro rata distribution but does not address the
issue of whether the technical rules should be more or less restrictive.
92. See description in Part I supra.
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this amount as a dividend. If each shareholder tendered ten per-
cent of his shares in exchange for his pro rata share of the distribu-
tion, the underlying equity interests of each shareholder would be
unchanged. Clearly, as a distribution out of surplus earnings and
profits by an ongoing corporation in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, the distribution should be treated as a dividend,"3 and it
would be so treated under current law.94
Suppose, however, that B and other shareholders tender to X
Corporation all of their shares, with a total value of $1,000,000, but
the remaining shareholders, including A, tender no shares. What
should be the effect of this transaction? Under section 302, B
would be entitled to exchange treatment.9 5 The question, however,
is whether this is appropriate 6 when the distributed assets were
attributable to surplus earnings and profits.
Professor Marvin Chirelstein provides a giant step toward the
answer in his classic analysis of the effect, and appropriate tax
treatment, of non pro rata share redemptions.9 7 Chirelstein bases
his analysis on the following assumptions. When X Corporation"8
makes the redemption, the market values the outstanding shares
at $11 per share (ten times earnings plus each share's pro rata
share of the undistributed surplus). Thus, B receives $110,000 in
exchange for his shares, in effect receiving a $10,000 dividend as
capital gain under section 302. Moreover, the effect of the redemp-
tion is to increase the underlying value of the unredeemed shares
by an amount equal to the dividend that they would have received
if the redemption proceeds had been distributed pro rata as an or-
dinary dividend. A's shares, therefore, are stil1 worth $110,000 after
the redemption. Under present law A may then receive his $10,000
"dividend" when he chooses by selling 1/11 of his shares and re-
ceive capital gain treatment of his gain.9
Based on this model Chirelstein suggests that a non pro rata
redemption should be viewed as a pro rata dividend to all share-
holders with the continuing shireholders then using their divi-
dends to purchase the shares of the redeemed shareholders. Thus,
93. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
94. See note 69 supra.
95. The Internal Revenue Code extends exchange treatment to a distribution in re-
demption of all the stock of the distributor owned by the redeeming shareholder. I.R.C. §§
302(a), 302(b)(3).
96. See note 91 supra.
97. Chirelstein, supra note 2.
98. See description in Part I supra.
99. See Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 740-41.
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A and B would each be treated as receiving a $10,000 dividend. A
would then be treated as purchasing a portion of the redeemed
shares worth $10,000, giving him shares worth $110,000. B would
be treated as selling his shares for $100,000, producing no gain or
loss. 00
The case for imputing a dividend to continuing shareholders is
compelling. The case for imputing a dividend to a redeemed share-
holder is less so. Our analysis suggests that a distribution out of
surplus earnings and profits by an ongoing corporation in the ordi-
nary course of business should be a dividend. 0 1 Thus, a portion of
B's redemption proceeds can be attributed to surplus earnings and
profits and, therefore, viewed as a dividend. If, however, B had
sold his shares to a new investor for $110,000 instead of tendering
them for redemption, a portion of the sale's proceeds would also be
attributable to B's pro rata share of then undistributed earnings
and profits. If, as our analysis suggests, B, when selling his shares,
is properly entitled to exchange treatment in full, 0 2 then equity
requires that B, when tendering his shares for redemption, receive
the same treatment. 03
100. Id. at 752-53.
101. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
103. It has recently been asserted that distributions in redemption are not analogous
to sales to new investors, even when looking at the effect on the distributes alone, because
"a redemption distribution delivers assets free from the prospective burden of corporate
income tax on their earnings, while a sale of shares to a noncorporate purchaser only deliv-
ers an interest in those assets subject to that burden." ALI TAX PROJECT, supra note 3, at
113. The critical assumption in this assertion is that the productive assets of a corporation
can be operated in partnership form as efficiently as in corporate form. If one accepts this
propositon, then a shareholder would prefer to receive the income from the asset without
first paying a corporate tax on such income.
The assumption is untenable, however. If General Motors distributed productive assets,
such as a truck division, in redemption of 10% of it shares, it is doubtful that the million
new partners would be able to operate the business at all. Even if this were possible, it is
likely that the additional legal and accounting costs would eliminate the advantage gained.
Smaller enterprises might be able to avoid the prospective burden of the corporate tax by
distributing productive assets to shareholders. Presumably, however, such enterprises oper-
ate as partnerships or as corporations under a Subchapter S election. Moreover, sales or
redemptions of the shares of closely-held corporations will often be at a price that reflects
underlying asset value. Investors in these enterprises do not contemplate indefinite life for
the corporation and may not expect any dividends during its life. The income stream may
be paid out monthly as salaries, thus avoiding the corporate tax. Thus, a shareholder will
not willingly sell for a price that reflects a prospective burden to which the assets are only
temporarily, and while to the advantage of the shareholders, subjected.
The assumption also is that productive assets will be distributed. Except in complete
liquidations, however, a corporation will retain productive assets and only distribute surplus
assets that it cannot invest more profitably than its shareholders.
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It is true that a selling B will be replaced by a new investor
who will later receive the surplus earnings and profits as a divi-
dend, whereas the redeemed B will be replaced by no new inves-
tors. This fact, however, does not require treating a redeemed B
differently from a selling B. Rather it suggests that B is replaced
by continuing shareholders who should be treated as receiving
their respective pro rata shares of the entire distribution.
A critical assumption made by Chirelstein is that the market
value will fully reflect the undistributed surplus earnings and prof-
its. A perfectly functioning market, however, would discount the
value of the undistributed surplus because of the uncertainty of
distribution and the tax to be paid on the prospective dividend.1"
Thus, if the true value of the underlying enterprise is $10 per
share, the price at the time of redemption would be more than $10,
but less than $11, per share. Consequently, Chirelstein bases his
conclusions on the unrealistic assumption that share price in a per-
fect market will fully reflect the amount of undistributed surplus.
Consider the implication of the equally unrealistic assumption that
the market will attach no value to increase or decrease in surplus.
Under this assumption the market would value X Corporation
at $10 per share before the redemption and at $11.1111 per share
after the redemption.20 5 When redeemed for $100,000, B only re-
covers his $100,000 investment and receives no benefit analogous
to a dividend. The total value of A's shares, however, increases as a
result of the redemption from $100,000 to $111,111. A has an ac-
tual gain equal to his pro rata share of the distributed surplus that
can be viewed as a dividend.
If, as should be the case in a perfect market, the price of X
shares partially reflects undistributed surplus, it is necessary to de-
termine how nonredeemed shareholders should be treated. The
nonredeemed shareholders will receive a greater benefit than the
redeemed shareholders in terms of immediately realizable gain in
the form of increased share value, although slightly less than their
pro rata share of the total distribution. Moreover, the taxation of
continuing shareholders in this manner will remove any incentive
104. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra. See generally Cohen et al., supra note
2, at 23; Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J.
861, 863-65 (1976).
105. The $1,000,000 distribution would result in the repurchase of 100,000 shares. X
Corporation would continue to be valued by the market at ten times earnings or at a total
value of $10,000,000. A owns 1/90 of the outstanding shares after the redemption, which
have a total value of $111,111.
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for corporations to undertake share redemptions absent demon-
strable corporate benefit flowing from the transaction. If this bene-
fit can be demonstrated, then presumably the market price slightly
undervalues the corporation in comparison to its worth after such
benefit is obtained through the redemption.108
Chirelstein's argument suffers as a result of his failure to dis-
tinguish between distributions out of surplus earnings and profits
and those out of needed earnings and profits. 10 7 His analysis be-
comes more compelling when this flaw is removed.108 It is then
clear that section 302 treatment of redeemed shareholders is analo-
gous to the treatment of one who sells to new investors, and thus,
is appropriate. Surplus earnings and profits, however, have been
distributed and a dividend should be imputed, but only to the
nonredeemed shareholders.
D. Bootstrap Acquisitions
A major consequence of the flaws in sections 302 and 346 is
the bootstrap acquisition bailout device. °10 A bootstrap acquisition
is one in which a major shift in share ownership is accomplished, at
least in part, through a distribution of corporate assets.11 0 The dis-
tribution may be in the form of a dividend or a redemption. Its
effect, necessarily, is to lessen the amount of money that the pur-
chaser or continuing shareholder would otherwise have to pay to
the seller. This situation raises the question of whether the seller
should be treated as receiving a dividend or be afforded exchange
treatment with respect to the corporate distribution. One must
also ask whether the purchaser or continuing shareholder should
be treated as receiving a constructive dividend in an amount equal
to the distribution received by the seller."'
106. Chirestein finds no corporate benefits flowing from a redemption that could not
equally be obtained by dividend. Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 741-47. Arguably, redemp-
tions that remove a troublesome minority interest or that enable a corporation to "go pri-
vate" would provide demonstrable benefit to the corporation. Obviously neither of these
benefits could be obtained by dividend.
107. Id. at 749.
108. For another view of the flaw in Chireistein's thesis, see Bacon, Share Redemp-
tions by Publicly Held Companies: A New Look at Dividend Equivalence, 26 TAx L. Rv.
283 (1971).
109. For a good description of this device, see Clark, supra note 5, at 113-14.
110. For two views of this problem, see Ginsburg, Letter to the Editors, 86 YALE L.J.
798, 800-05 (1977); Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions: The Re-
demption Route vs. the Dividend Route, 87 HARv. L. lav. 1459 (1974).
111. While Professor Chirestein believes that Congress has made no policy choice
against imputing dividends as a result of share redemptions by public corporations, he be-
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The case law suggests certain generally predictable results of a
bootstrap acquisition. If the seller receives a corporate distribution
in redemption of some of his shares, exchange treatment can be
expected. If the seller receives the distribution in the form of a
dividend, he may still receive exchange treatment with respect to
the distribution if it constitutes a constructive dividend to the pur-
chaser or continuing shareholder. Whether the distribution is in
the form of a dividend or redemption, the purchaser will receive a
constructive dividend if the "distribution relieves him of an ex-
isting primary and unconditional obligation to acquire the subject
stock." '112 Even if no such obligation is removed, a distribution in
the form of a dividend may be imputed to the purchaser or contin-
uing shareholder if the purchaser was the beneficial owner of the
purchased shares at the time of dividend declaration or if the divi-
dend was "an essential step in a bootstrap acquisition plan."
113
The existing case law places a premium on form, rather than
substance.114 This approach is understandable in view of the gen-
eral misperception of what, in substance, is a dividend. Our analy-
sis, however, suggests that the appropriate consideration is
whether the distribution is of surplus earnings and profits or of
needed earnings and profits. This is an appropriate starting point
to attempt to clarify the bootstrap acquisition problem.
Suppose that A and B each own fifty per cent of the shares of
X Corporation.1 At the beginning of Year Eleven X Corporation
redeems B's shares for $5,00,000.116 Alternatively, assume that A
lieves the contrary to be true with respect to closely-held corporations. Chirestein, supra
note 2, at 750. He suggests that § 302 must be deemed to reflect a basic and presently
unchallengeable congressional policy to extend capital gains treatment to redemptions by
closely-held corporations in order "to facilitate occasional, and often major, shifts in owner-
ship interests among the shareholders of closely-held or family-owned corporations for
whose shares no active market exists apart from the company itself." Id. The accumulated
earnings tax provisions, however, indicate that Congress has never intended to allow closely-
held corporations to retain surplus earnings and profits. Thus, it cannot be seriously sug-
gested that Congress has manifested an intent to allow significant amounts of surplus earn-
ings and profits to be converted into capital gains as a means of facilitating shifts of control.
Moreover, the profusion of bootstrap acquisition cases indicates a visceral agreement by
courts and the Service with the proposition that the policy underlying § 302 requires, in a
proper case, imputing a dividend to the nonrecipient beneficiary of a closely-held corpora-
tion's distribution.
112. Jassy, supra note 110, at 1476.
113. Id. at 1475-76.
114. See B. BrrrxmE & J. EusTIcz, supra note 26, at 9.25; Ginsburg, supra note 110.
115. See description in Part I supra.
116. Assume that the corporation distributed annual earnings of $1,000,000 as a divi-
dend at year end.
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owns 100 per cent of the shares, B purchases fifty per cent for
$5,000,000, and X Corportion redeems the remainder for
$5,000,000. Before the redemption X Corporation has no surplus
assets and must, therefore, borrow $5,000,000 in order to accom-
plish the redemption. 117
The distribution is out of needed earnings and profits and
contributed capital and thus, should not be characterized as a divi-
dend in either case.118 Indeed, this distribution constitutes a par-
tial liquidation and should be so treated under a properly designed
section 346.119 Unlike a non pro rata distribution of surplus assets,
a distribution out of needed earnings and profits provides no basis
for imputing a dividend to the nonrecipient. Here, the lender is
substituted for B and has a prior and substantial call on future
profits. There has been a decrease in underlying enterprise value at
the shareholder level in an amount roughly equal to the value of
the distribution. B has received nothing that can be viewed as a
dividend.
Suppose that we vary our hypothetical bootstrap acquisition
in one respect. X Corporation has an underlying enterprise value
of only $5,000,000, attributable to contributed capital of $1,000,000
and needed earnings and profits of $4,000,000, and has surplus
earnings and profits of $5,000,000.120 The distribution in redemp-
tion of A's shares now comes entirely out of surplus earnings and
profits. The above analysis suggests that A should be entitled to
exchange treatment, but that a dividend should be imputed to B in
117. This example assumes, as Chirelstein suggests, that no one could be found who
would purchase all of the shares.
118. This characterization is consistent with the definition of a dividend as a distribu-
tion out of surplus earnings and profits.
119. It is a partial liquidation because the corporation distributes needed earnings and
profits, which results in a proportionate drop in underlying enterprise value. See text ac-
companying notes 79-90 supra. Thus, a partial liquidation involves a "contraction" at a
given point in time, regardless of whether the corporation is able or intends to grow later.
Real, measurable, proportionate decrease in enterprise value caused by distribution of
needed earnings and profits is the standard. Use of terms such as "contraction," leads to
confusion on this point and makes analysis difficult. See, e.g., Cohen et a., supra note 2, at
37.
120. This hypothetical will remind the reader of the facts in Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213
F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954). In Zenz the court considered the issue of whether
a distribution of substantially all of the accumulated earnings and surplus of a corpora-
tion, which are not necessary to the conduct of the business of the corporation, in re-
demption of all outstanding shares of stock of said corporation owned by one person,
[is] essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend under the Internal
Revenue Code.
Id. at 915. The court, in holding that it was not, reached, in my opinion, an incorrect result.
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the amount of the distribution." 1
Bootstrap acquisitions, then, would present no conceptual or
practical problem under properly designed sections 302 and 346.
Section 302 would apply to distributions attributable to surplus
earnings and profits and would impose a dividend consequence on
purchasers or continuing shareholders to the extent the redeemed
shareholders qualified for exchange treatment. Section 346 would
apply to distributions attributable to needed earnings and profits
and would not impose a dividend consequence on continuing
shareholders.
V. CORPORATE SEPARATIONS
A detailed treatment of corporate separations is, of course, be-
yond the scope of this Article.122 The problems associated with
partial liquidations and corporate separations are, however, closely
linked.1 23 It is submitted that treating partial liquidations as sug-
gested in this Article would allow a simple and fair resolution to
the problem posed by a corporate separation.
In the archetypical corporate separation a corporation places
the assets of one of its businesses in a subsidiary and distributes
the shares of the subsidiary pro rata to its shareholders. The trans-
action is in the form of a dividend, and is literally out of earnings
and profits.1 2 4
Congress has struggled to draw a line between a good separa-
tion and a bad one. If the assets placed in the subsidiary are those
of an active business, and if the separation is motivated by busi-
ness purpose or necessity, the transaction is thought to effect
121. See analysis in Part IV, Section C supra. If a dividend is imputed to B, he will, of
course, require that the redemption price be set at an amount, lower than $5,000,000, which
will compensate B for the cost of the imputed dividend.
122. For the definitive article on the history and present treatment of corporate sepa-
ration, see Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separa-
tions Under the 1954 Code, 81 H&nv. L. REv. 1194 (1968).
123. See Surrey, supra note 77, at 9.
124. There are three types of corporate separations-spin-offs, split-offs, and split-
ups. In a spin-off or split-off a corporation first places some of its assets in a subsidiary
corporation or purchases a corporation. In a split-off the parent company is a mere holding
company. In a spin-off the shares of the subsidiary are distributed as a dividend, but in a
split-off the shares of the subsidiary are distributed in redemption of shares of the parent.
In a split-up the shares of the subsidiaries are distributed in complete liquidation of the
parent. The effect of each type of corporate separation is the same. The shareholders of the
former parent now hold shares in more than one corporation. No corporate assets have left
solution. Thus, the shareholders now have a direct interest in two corporate baskets, but the
total content equals that of the former basket.
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merely a change of form and to be of insufficient magnitude to
constitute a taxable event.12 5 If, however, the assets placed in the
subsidiary are liquid assets that should be distributed as a divi-
dend, then the distribution should be treated as a dividend. Other-
wise, the separation would soon be followed by a complete liquida-
tion of the spun-off subsidiary that would convert ordinary income
into capital gain.12 6 The crux of the problem, then, is the need to
allow legitimate corporate separations but prevent conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain. The present treatment of corpo-
rate separations, however, is a web of uncertainty.
The statute presents three significant hurdles. Each of the cor-
porations previously housed under one umbrella must be engaged
in the active conduct of a trade or business immediately after the
distribution.12 7 The trade or business must have been actively con-
ducted throughout the five-year period ending on the date of dis-
tribution.1 2 8 The transaction must not have been "used principally
as a device for the distribution of the earnings and profits of the
distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both.'1 29
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service attempts to test each
transaction to determine if it is motivated by a legitimate business
purpose.130
The active business test has been attacked13 1 because of the
definitional uncertainties and because of its irrelevance to the ba-
sic problem of determining whether a transaction is being used to
convert dividend income into capital gain.13 2 The device test is
criticized because it requires an inquiry into motive and a predic-
125. For instance, the divestment by a corporation that has long operated two active
businesses of one of the businesses as a result of antitrust litigation would not be considered
a taxable event. See Proposed Tress. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2), Example 1, 42 Fed. Reg. 2695
(1977).
126. The classic case is Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Gregory was the
sole shareholder of X Corporation, which owned marketable securities. Rather than dis-
tribute these as a dividend, the corporation placed the securities in a newly created subsidi-
ary, the shares of which were spun off to Gregory. The transaction literally constituted a
reorganization under the Revenue Act of 1928. Three days after the spin-off, the subsidiary
was liquidated and the securities sold. Gregory reported her gain as capital gain. Id. at 467.
Because no business purpose existed, the Court refused to honor the form of the transaction
and treated the spin-off as a taxable dividend. Id. at 469-70.
127. I.R.C. § 355(b)(1).
128. I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(B).
129. LR.C. § 355(a)(1)(B).
130. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b), 42 Fed. Reg. 2695 (1977).
131. This criticism does not apply in dealing with the liquid asset case presented by
Gregory. See note 126 supra.
132. See Surrey, supra note 77, at 10; Whitman, supra note 122, at 1210-11.
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tion of future behavior, both of which are tricky propositions.33
The business purpose inquiry is also irrelevant when the basic
question is whether conversion of dividend income into capital
gain will occur.1 '
The appropriate standard appears quite simple. Each separa-
tion should be tested to determine whether the assets of the sepa-
rated corporations could have been directly distributed to the
shareholders in a transaction qualifying for capital gains treat-
ment. The separation would thus be required to satisfy section 302
or 346.135 The Service would have little difficulty with such a rule
for a non pro rata separation.13 's The problem lies with section 346.
The Service cannot allow a safe harbor for transactions that could
qualify under section 346, because section 346(b) allows planned
conversion of surplus earnings and profits into capital gain. 37
Consider X Corporation as previously described in Situation
No. 2.1" The present section 346(b) would extend exchange treat-
ment to the pro rata distribution of the hotel business described in
Situation No. 2; despite the fact that its entire value is attributable
to surplus earnings and profits of the continuing business. The
Service is obviously unwilling to extend a safe harbor to pro rata
separations on the basis of their ability to qualify under section
346(b).
It is evident that a problem exists with present section 355.
One suggested cure has been to "taint" the spun-off stock, either
for some fixed period of time 13 or permanently.140 If the taint is
for a fixed period of time, then disposition after a specified period
of time could be made as capital gain. The only effect of a limited
taint, then, is to lengthen the amount of time involved in planned
133. Cohen, Reconciling Business Purpose with Bail-out Prevention: Federal Tax
Policy and Corporate Divisions, 28 STAN. L. Rav. 1077, 1088 (1976).
134. Cf. Bales, The Business Purpose of Corporate Separations, 56 VA. L. Rzv. 1242
(1970) (Bales suggests that the business purpose doctrine may have some vitality in spite of
§ 355).
135. Of course, a simple active business requirement is also required to deal with pure
liquid asset cases like Gregory. See note 126 supra.
136. The Proposed Income Tax Regulations state that "in any case in which a distri-
bution with respect to each distributee would be treated as a redemption to which § 302(a)
would apply if it were taxable, the transaction is ordinarily not considered to be a device for
the distribution of earnings and profits." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1), 42 Fed. Reg.
2695 (1977).
137. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
138. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
139. See Whitman, supra note 122, at 1250.
140. See Cohen, supra note 133, at 1098-99;. Surrey, supra note 77, at 13.
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conversion of dividend income into capital gain. If, however, the
taint is permanent, then dividend treatment in the future may be
imposed on transactions that could have qualified for capital gain
treatment if taxed at the time of distribution.
Recognition of the inherent flaw in section 346 is a prerequi-
site to curing the basic defects in section 355. If section 346 is re-
designed14 1 to prevent the conversion of dividend income into capi-
tal gain, then section 355 can be simplified by eliminating the
"device," "business purpose," and five-year active business re-
quirements. All that should be required is that the distributing
and spun-off corporations each be engaged in an active business,
and that the assets of each corporation could be directly distrib-
uted in a transaction that would qualify for capital gains treatment
under either section 302 or 346.
VI. THE LIQUDATION-REINCORPORATMN BAILoUT
The failure of Congress to attach a dividend consequence to
the portion of a liquidating distribution that is out of surplus earn-
ings and profits141 makes possible the liquidation-reincorporation
bailout.1 43 Assume that X Corporation has a substantial accumula-
tion of surplus earnings and profits and is, therefore, concerned
about the accumulated earnings tax. Although Congress clearly
desires that these surplus earnings and profits be distributed as a
dividend,144 a corporation with surplus earnings and profits will
often be "liquidated." The shareholders of the old corporation re-
tain the surplus assets, but the operating assets are contributed to
a newly formed corporation that continues to operate the busi-
ness. 43 This enables the shareholders of the old corporation to ex-
tract the surplus earnings and profits in a transaction that on its
face qualifies for exchange, and capital gain, treatment.
141. See proposal accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
143. For a detailed discussion of the possible forms and advantages of the liquidation-
reincorporation device, see Clark, supra note 5, at 125-30. We are interested here only in a
bare outline of the problem and an indication of the necessary solution consonant with the
underlying principles. For an in-depth analysis of the present law, see Hjorth, Liquidations
and Reincorporaton-Before and After Davant, 42 WASH. L. REv. 737 (1967); Lane, The
Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HAv. L. Rzv. 1218
(1964).
144. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
145. Alternatively, the operating assets may be sold to the new corporation by the old
corporation, which then distributes the surplus earnings and profits and the proceeds of the
sale of the operating assets to the shareholders of the old corporation.
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The Service has resolutely challenged liquidation-reincorpora-
tion transactions, attempting to characterize them as sham liquida-
tions, or as reorganizations under section 368(a)(1)(D), (E), or (F).
If substantial or complete identity exists between the shareholders
of the old and new corporations the Service has been reasonably
successful in persuading courts that such transactions constitute
reorganizations accompanied by the distribution of boot taxable as
a dividend. If, however, a court finds an insufficient continuity of
interest or is unable or unwilling to engage in the mental gymnas-
tics necessary to recharacterize a particular transaction, taxpayers
are successful. 146
The focus of the analysis by the Service and courts in a liqui-
dation-reincorporation should be whether or not surplus earnings
and profits are being removed from the corporation.1 47 The trans-
action should be characterized as a dividend if and to the extent
that surplus earnings and profits are removed; if not, exchange
treatment is appropriate. An analysis that entails inquiry into the
subsequent use made of the operating assets distributed, the busi-
ness purpose for the transaction, and the amount of continuity of
interest between shareholders of the old and new corporation is
clumsy and utilizes inappropriate tools that are certain to promote
taxpayer uncertainty and case law chaos.
Suppose that hypothetical Z Corporation distributes assets
with a book and fair market value of $10,000,000 to its two share-
holders, A and B, who immediately form New Corporation in a
different state and contribute the assets formerly owned by Z Cor-
poration to New Corporation. The assets distributed by Z Corpora-
tion were attributable solely to needed earnings and profits and
contributed capital. Accordingly, A and B should be entitled to ex-
change treatment of the liquidating distribution, since no surplus
earnings and profits were distributed. Suppose, instead, that one-
146. See B. Brrrxaa & J. EusTmE, supra note 26, at 1 14.54.
147. It is often asserted that a liquidation-reincorporation should also be sanctioned if
its purpose is to achieve a step-up in the basis of operating assets. Suppose a corporation
has operating assets with a fair market value of $20,000,000 and a basis of $10,000,000.
Should the shareholders of the corporation be able to liquidate it and reincorporate, thereby
stepping-up the basis of the operating assets to $20,000,000? Why should continuing share-
holders be denied a step-up that would be available to new investors who purchased these
assets? Is the real concern the step-up in basis or the avoidance at the corporate level of a
tax on the gain inherent in the operating assets? This aspect of the Hquidation-reincorpora-
tion problem is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough analysis and suggested
approach, see ALI Fanmiar. INcoME TAx PRo.ar SUBCHAPTER C CORPORATs DIsTRUTIONS
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977).
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half of Z Corporation's liquidating distribution is of surplus earn-
ings and profits. To that extent, the distribution should be treated
as a dividend.
The form, business purpose, and continuity of interest of these
two transactions are identical. The substance, however, is different.
Revising section 331 to characterize distributions in complete liq-
uidation as a dividend to the extent of out-of-surplus earnings and
profits would prevent a liquidation-reincorporation transaction
from being used to bail out dividends as capital gain14 and would
provide a means for distinguishing between a good liquidation-
reincorporation transaction and a bad one.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the confusion and complexity in the present system
of taxing corporate distributions can be traced to the mistaken
view that earnings and profits, in toto, constitute a reservoir from
which future dividends will flow. An analysis of the origin and de-
velopment of the present system suggests, instead, that a distribu-
tion should be treated as a dividend to someone, although not al-
ways the recipient, only to the extent that it is out of surplus
earnings and profits. To the extent a distribution is instead out of
needed earnings and profits it should be treated as received in ex-
change for the shares actually or constructively redeemed. Further,
the problems and complexities in the present Internal Revenue
Code section 355 can be traced directly to the flaws that exist in
sections 302 and 346. The problems and complexities in section
355 could be eliminated if sections 302 and 346 accorded dividend
treatment only to distributions of surplus earnings and profits and
accorded exchange treatment only to distributions of needed earn-
ings and profits.
It is important to realize that it is possible to perfect the pre-
sent system in a way capable of fair, accurate, and efficient admin-
istration. This could be accomplished by amending the present
148. One cannot help but feel that many judicial decisions in this area can only be
understood as representing the court's viscereal understanding of the result required by un-
derlying policy. For example, in the oft-discussed Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144
(1962), the court refused to recharacterize a liquidation-reincorporation as a reorganization
accompanied by a distribution of boot. The court acknowledged the existence of valid busi-
ness purpose and continuity of business enterprise, id. at 157, but respected the literal, inte-
grated form of the transaction, which resulted in an insufficient continuity of shareholder
interest. Id. at 157, 163. One must wonder how much the court was influenced by the fact
that none of the assets distributed were surplus assets.
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Code to establish a statutory presumption that a distribution of
corporate assets is out of surplus earnings and profits, except to
the extent the taxpayer can show, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the distribution is out of needed earnings and profits.
The legislative history accompanying the amending legislation
could use examples, such as those presented in this Article, to
demonstrate which distributions Congress intended to be treated
as out of surplus earnings and profits and which it intended to be
treated as out of needed earnings and profits. The legislative his-
tory would indicate that a distribution would not constitute a dis-
tribution of needed earnings and profits unless it materially and in
reasonable proportion to its value effected a reduction in underly-
ing enterprise value, as opposed to a mere reduction in net asset
value.
Recognition of the bifurcated nature of earnings and profits
and the true nature of a dividend suggests further reform of the
present system. Because earnings and profits constitute only a his-
torical measure of the undistributed earnings of a corporation and
reflect neither appreciation in the value of assets nor underlying
enterprise value, any distribution of surplus assets should be a div-
idend, and any distribution of needed assets should be treated as
in exchange for shares actually or constructively redeemed, without
regard to the status of the earnings and profits account.114
Moreover, an understanding of the bifurcated nature of earn-
ings and profits and of the correct line between a dividend and a
distribution that is entitled to exchange treatment, is important
because it provides a starting point for meaningful consideration of
broader reform of the present system. These distinctions demon-
strate to those who favor treating all corporate distributions as div-
idends that the only appropriate remedy is to eliminate the capital
gains preference, not only for corporate distributions but also for
gains on sales of shares in the market. This is so because a sale of
shares is merely a way of realizing the gain represented by needed
earnings and profits. This Article has suggested the steps to be
taken by any reform effort concerned with drawing the appropriate
line between distributions that are dividends and those that are
entitled to exchange treatment.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an understanding of
the underlying rationale of the present system reveals the great in-
consistencies between the system's effects and that basic rationale.
149. See note 86 supra.
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Realization of the discrepancy should motivate the Service and the
courts to bend the present system to a shape that comports as
much as possible with its underlying principles.

